By Richard H Kohn, Joseph P Harahan
Air Superiority in global conflict II and Korea: An Interview with Gen. James Ferguson, Gen. Robert M. Lee, Gen. William Momyer, and Lt. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada (USAF Warrior stories)
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Additional info for Air superiority in World War II and Korea : an interview with Gen. James Ferguson, Gen. Robert M. Lee, Gen. William W. Momyer, and Lt. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada
In Europe we considered a target out to six hundred miles as strategic; fighters seldom ranged beyond three hundred for ground attack. Yet, when we looked at Spike’s more recent experience in Vietnam, we saw B-52s hitting close-in targets and fighters doing the deep penetrations. Momyer: I would like to ask General Quesada a $64 question. When Eisenhower had made his decision some months prior to the invasion, what kind of assessment was made that you could tell him, “We will have control of the air, and there is no question about our ability to control the air so that your invasion can take place”?
Arthur Coningham, “The Development of Tactical Air Forces,” Journal of the United Services Institure IX (1946), 211-271. 34 WORLD WAR I1 air forces geared to the actions of each field army. This was about the time you were in North Africa, Spike. S. Air Force as a separate but equal military entity. Lee: One interjection since we are talking about “Maori” Coningham. You brought to my mind that in the preparation of this first manual by Ralph Stearley and at General Arnold’s direction, Stearley based this philosophy of control of the air, first as a prerequisite to proper air and ground operations, on.
Adolf Hitler wasn’t willing really to pursue that, and he shifted the target system. When he shifted to the ports, he shifted to targets that initially had to be neutralized before invading. That premature shift, I think, is the thing really. If the German air force had pursued the same sort of doctrine as in Poland, the same sort of doctrine that had been pursued in France, which was to gain air superiority over the battlefield-and the same thing that had been pursued in the first campaigns against the Soviet Union-the outcome in the Battle of Britain might have been different.